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Why Britain Should
not Join in the War against Iraq
Sean Gabb
The newspapers - at least, those that I read - and virtually all the
politicians, seem agreed on war with Iraq. There is, as ever, much dissent from
the Establishment position, not least in the opinion polls. But the only
questions outstanding among those who matter in this country are when and with
how much force. I am among the dissidents. I believe that war with Iraq would
not secure any sufficiently great British interest, and therefore that it would
inflict unnecessary suffering. In this article, I will explain the grounds for
my belief.
I accept that war is a legitimate instrument of state policy. This being
said, it is a terrible instrument. It brings immediate death and maiming
to serviceman, and nowadays to much larger numbers of civilians. It also can
have longer term and still worse consequences in terms of further commitments
and lingering hatreds. And it is commonly used as an excuse for higher taxes and
losses of freedom at home. Before going to war, then, we need closely to examine
whether the full weight of certain and probable suffering can be justified in
terms of the national interest.
This is, I know, a loose concept, and can be twisted by bellicose
politicians and journalists in defence of any number of foreign
interventions. Even so, it can be given reasonably clear meaning. We can divide
the national interest into primary, secondary and tertiary. For Britain, as for
other countries, the primary interest is the security of our home territory, so
that we can go safely about our everyday business. For us, since we are a
trading nation largely dependent on imported food and other resources, primary
interest also includes securing the sea approaches to our islands. Our secondary
interest includes remaining on friendly terms with our immediate neighbours -
and, where convenient, enjoying a loose and benevolent dominion over them. Our
tertiary interests are the protection of British lives and property in other
countries.
The first of these interests is about as absolute as can be imagined. A
credible threat of nuclear annihilation, without hope of retaliating,
might justify abandoning it. But short of that, territorial defence
justifies any degree of force - always granting it is reasonably
unavoidable, and no more than is needed to secure its object. The second and
third depend much more on circumstances, and require nice judgements of whether
the force needed is worth the desired object.
Of course, even primary interest is not always easy to define in detail,
and there is room for disagreement. I do not think, for example, there is any
doubt that our first big war with Louis XIV was justified. He had
taken in the exiled Stuart King, and was actively working for his
restoration. That would, if successful, have entailed the voiding of our
constitution and our becoming a satellite of France. But was our second big war
with him - over the Spanish succession - equally justified? Perhaps the
effective joining of France and Spain would have enabled a more successful
attack on us in the future. Perhaps not. Some claimed it was a war of national
defence, others that it was an excuse for the Whigs and the moneyed interest to
entrench themselves still further. There are similar debates over our two big
wars of the last century, and over the Cold War. I take a pacific line on all
three, though accept that there are often persuasive arguments on the other
side. But, while there is room for debate over its meaning in any given set of
circumstances, primary interest usually can be defined, and even defined without
controversy.
What makes these arguments over interest so important it that a clear
understanding of them is the best means of avoiding or containing wars. When a
country's interests are settled and stated to the rest of the world, they can be
taken into account by other countries. Sometimes, they will conflict with those
of other countries, and there may be a war. At least as often, though, their
statement will provide a stable framework within which other countries can
pursue their own interests in the most economic manner. For example, in the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870, Bismark knew that helping France was not in British
interests, and that its reduction would in itself bring no adverse consequences.
At the same time, he knew that trying to shorten the war by an attack through
Belgium, or a long occupation of France, or a seizure of its colonies, would
provoke some level of British response. There are many other cases where wars
have been avoided or contained by turning foreign policy into a game of chess.
To be sure, a country can try to widen its primary interest to include
more than territorial security. The Romans and British did this in defence of
their empires, and the Americans in Indo-China when they announced the
containment of Communism to be part of their primary interest. However, unless -
as with the British and Romans - the additional territories are seriously
regarded as part of the home territory, this will tend to destabilise
international relations. Despite all that was said in Washington, the Soviets
and local Communists knew that the American commitment to South Vietnam and
Cambodia was not absolute, and that enough escalation of the war would get the
Americans out.
Nor is it merely prudential for a country to narrow its definition of
primary interest to defence of the home territory. A state is nothing more than
the agent of the people who live in a country. It is therefore
morally obliged to take a narrow - and even selfish - view of the national
interest. If a man, acting in his personal capacity, gives money to charity, he
is rightly praised for his virtue. If he does the same as a trustee, without
taking instructions, or against the clear terms of his trust, he rightly opens
himself to action in the courts. It is the same with politicians. It is one
thing for a minister to resign form office and sign up for some foreign cause in
which he passionately believes. It is something else for him to commit the lives
and money of other people to going about the world as a knight errant.
And so, before starting a war with Iraq, it is necessary for our
Government to show as clearly as possible what British interests will
thereby be secured and at what probable cost. So far, this has not been done.
We are told that Saddam Hussain has, or soon will have, "weapons of mass
destruction", and that he plainly intends to use these against us. If true, this
would justify war. However, there is no credible evidence that he has these
weapons. His country has been under close blockade since 1990. Nothing enters or
leaves without knowledge. For much of this time, it has been subject to close
internal inspection by the United Nations. Notoriously, the inspectors have
found nothing. Claims that Mr Hussain is "about" to develop such weapons are
based on simple assertion: any evidence on which the claims are based remains
unpublished. Even if he does or soon will have these weapons, there is no reason
to suppose he intends to use them against us. Where are his means of delivery
against a modern, well-defended country like ours? What reason have we to
believe he
would even try? We are told that he might try using them. He might try doing any
number of things. He might dye his hair green, or have a sex change operation.
But there is no reason to suppose he will do any such thing. Until 1990, his
main objectives were to keep himself in power by murdering anyone who got in his
way, and to bully his neighbours whenever he thought the Americans would
approve. His known character is as black as can be imagined, but does not seem
likely to endanger any primary British interest.
There is the oil. Iraq
has large reserves, and the invasion of
Kuwait
would have greatly increased these - as would whatever degree of control over
Saudi Arabia Mr Hussain might have contemplated in 1990. But there is a lot of
oil in the world outside his reach; and at best, he might simply have increased
his own revenues by selling oil at prices set within a larger market. Tertiary
British interests might have suffered by his local hegemony - and might still
suffer if he were freed from the blockade of his country. But the necessary
action in defence of these would not be proportionate to their value.
Even without the Americans to do most of the fighting and spending, we could
probably invade Iraq
at little immediate cost. But we are not just talking here about immediate cost.
Destroying the present Iraqi Government would almost certainly fragment the
country, leading to threats of partial annexation by Turkey and Iran and Syria, and to chronic
instability in those parts that remained. Conquest must therefore entail
indefinite occupation. This in turn must raise hatreds throughout the rest of
the Islamic world that we now know cannot be ignored. We cannot know exactly
what would be the final costs of war would be, but we have excellent reason to
know that they would be heavier than of any previous intervention in that
region.
There is another attempted justification - still passing round by word of mouth.
This is that the Iraqis were behind the American bombings last 11th
September. If they were, this might justify war. As I have granted elsewhere,
these bombings were rather like piracy, so far as they could easily be repeated
against any other Western country; and therefore, a war of punishment could
possibly be justified in terms of primary interest.
The problem here, though, is credibility. We were repeatedly assured that Osama
bin Laden had directed those bombings. On the strength of these assurances, we
invaded Afghanistan. We are now stuck there, trying to keep order between
various gangs of bandits; and the evidence on which we went in has turned out so
insubstantial that it is being quietly withdrawn in favour of a new set of
accusations. Without firm, published evidence for an Iraqi connection, I for one
do not intend to give a moment's belief to these accusations.
I can think of one other valid reason for war. This is that we have a
strong interest in keeping friendly with the Americans. Sooner or later,
some mainstream British politician will squeeze together enough courage to argue
for withdrawal from the European Union. This argument will be more easily won if
there is the alternative open of joining NAFTA. I would prefer withdrawal to be
followed by no other connection. To twist the old Socialist Worker slogan, I
want neither Brussels nor Washington, but complete national independence.
However, domination by the second would be less humiliating and more accountable
than by the first. And if we are to keep that option open, perhaps we need to
show willing in whatever crusade
Mr Bush cares to announce.
The argument against is that there is probably no such need. The Americans
encouraged the formation of the European Union back in the days when they wanted
a local counterweight to the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.
Those days have passed, and the Americans are now beginning to see the European
Union as at least an annoying competitor for world influence. Weakening it, by
pulling Britain out, is in their interests regardless of whether we join or fail
to join in their war against Iraq. Indeed, for the British Government to take
the European line, of neutrality, might bring the weakening of the European
Union closer to the top of the American foreign policy agenda.
And so, for what little it may be worth, my sentence is for peace. If the
Americans really want a war with Iraq, let them fight it by themselves,
and let them by themselves pay whatever costs it may entail.
==========================
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